Book Review: My Year in Iraq
This was a riveting read at times, with details on Iraq that I had either not heard or forgotten. It is very much a political history of the Coaltiion Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Governing Council (mostly the exiles). Bremer illustrates the difficulties of creating a new Iraq, and the "post-war" plan.
There are four major mistakes that Bremer and the Administration made in post-invasion Iraq, creating the turmoil and the aggressive insurgency. Bremer identifies all of them, even if he explains why it would have been impossible another way, or why it wasn't his fault. Parts of this book read like Bremer defending himself, as he often mentions his position as being set up to be the fall guy for any mistakes in occupation.
The mistakes are all intertwined. The first was not arresting Muqtada al-Sadr early on, which Bremer wanted to do, but was blocked by the Shia on the Governing Council, who wished not to disrupt the delicate balance they had with al-Sadr, only allowing he and his army to fester in Baghdad. The second is the delay of military action in Fallujah to clear out the insurgency, also because of the Governing Council's wishes.
The third major mistake is de-Baathification. The original CPA plan called for only high-level 'full believers' in the Baath Party to be barred from government, as many teachers were forced to join the party to teach. Ahmed Chalabi escalated this policy to encompass much more of the infrastructure of Iraq than Bremer and the CPA had called for in Order No. 1.
The fourth major mistake is lies completely on the US. The counting of Iraqi police and New Iraq Army forces so as to reduce U.S. troop numbers was a huge error. It made the administration look bad, and was intended as a political move in the first place.
Beyond all of those, it seems that Iraq is getting better, and I think the country has a bright future ahead of it.
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