The Iraq Study Group Report: Thoughts
So I've just finished the Iraq Study Group Report, and I'd like to share my thoughts.
First, the makeup of the Study Group is interesting. First, there are no generals on the commission, though they consulted with many. I wonder if they asked Schwartzkopf or Colin Powell and they declined. I think it is also important to note that (with the departure of Rudy Giuliani) there are no 2008 contenders in the Group, as well as there not being anyone who is usually identified as a neocon (no one from the Wolfowitz/Rumsfeld/Cheney cadre).
At this point in the occupation, I am completely ready for a new direction in Iraq. In 2004 and even into 2005, "Stay the course" made sense as a policy. Elections were being held, and it looked as though Iraq was on the up-and-up. Something has drastically changed. The country has high levels of sectarian violence between Shi'ia and Sunni, and has been teetering on the edge of open civil war for several months. As with many situations like this, it matters little who got you into this mess, only how you ended up there and what you can do to get out. This is certainly the focus maintained by the Group.
Mistakes were made by the Administration post-invasion, that much is certain. Newt Gingrich was on Meet the Press last Sunday (transcript), and talked about some of these mistakes. The several I see were:
1. No Iraqi face on the Coalition Provisional Authority
2. No pressuring of the Iraqis to do something with al-Sadr, who's militias are a primary cause of violence in Baghdad.
3. The escalation of De-Baathification by Ahmed Chalabi, forcing most of the Iraqi technocrats out of government or the country
4. A lack of understanding by the US as to why 1, 2, and 3 are serious problems.
5. The fudging of training numbers with the Iraqi Army and Policy by the Pentagon.
The main topic of the Group's report is what to do now, and the central issue it touches on is the delicate balance between outright leading the Iraqis and taking a "sink or swim" mentality. Sending more troops in would tilt the balance towards a continued occupation, and a complete withdraw will leave Iraq in complete shambles, which could result (very easily) in an Iran-backed Shi'ia dictatorship. The middle point in that spectrum is to guide the Iraqis along in finding their own destiny, much like the Marshall Plan did with European countries after WWII.
The Report is enumerated throughout with 79 Recommendations, many of which are obvious. The "plan" that the Report offers is basically to push Iraq toward complete self-governance, and to diplomatically engage allies and enemies to do so. I have no problem with this concept, and involving non-Coalition members in Iraq at this point seems like a very good idea.
However, here is where I think the Report runs astray. They strongly advocate engaging Iran and Syria, both neighbors to Iraq. The Group seems to assume that it is in Iran and Syira's best interests to see a stable, democratic Iraq. I find fault with this assumption that two of the most autocratic regimes (one a dictatorship, the other a theocracy) in the world would want a free, democratic, Muslim nation right in their own backyard. If this didn't seem to be such a crux of the Report, I think the entire thing would come across better.
One thing point that the Group makes that I find compelling is that there "is no military solution" in Iraq. They cite that US forces will go in, clear an area, and as soon as they leave, it will become "hot" again. You cannot fight a hydra like that. Cleaning up Iraq's ministries as well as reforming the US State department will go much further in understanding and eradicating the Sunni insurgency and the Shi'ia militias.
We need a complete overhaul on Iraq policy, and more importantly, attitude, and we need it soon.
You can read the Iraq Study Group Report free online here, or you can purchase a hard copy from the Amazon link above. I think it is worth serious consideration, but is not a full solution on its own.
First, the makeup of the Study Group is interesting. First, there are no generals on the commission, though they consulted with many. I wonder if they asked Schwartzkopf or Colin Powell and they declined. I think it is also important to note that (with the departure of Rudy Giuliani) there are no 2008 contenders in the Group, as well as there not being anyone who is usually identified as a neocon (no one from the Wolfowitz/Rumsfeld/Cheney cadre).
At this point in the occupation, I am completely ready for a new direction in Iraq. In 2004 and even into 2005, "Stay the course" made sense as a policy. Elections were being held, and it looked as though Iraq was on the up-and-up. Something has drastically changed. The country has high levels of sectarian violence between Shi'ia and Sunni, and has been teetering on the edge of open civil war for several months. As with many situations like this, it matters little who got you into this mess, only how you ended up there and what you can do to get out. This is certainly the focus maintained by the Group.
Mistakes were made by the Administration post-invasion, that much is certain. Newt Gingrich was on Meet the Press last Sunday (transcript), and talked about some of these mistakes. The several I see were:
1. No Iraqi face on the Coalition Provisional Authority
2. No pressuring of the Iraqis to do something with al-Sadr, who's militias are a primary cause of violence in Baghdad.
3. The escalation of De-Baathification by Ahmed Chalabi, forcing most of the Iraqi technocrats out of government or the country
4. A lack of understanding by the US as to why 1, 2, and 3 are serious problems.
5. The fudging of training numbers with the Iraqi Army and Policy by the Pentagon.
The main topic of the Group's report is what to do now, and the central issue it touches on is the delicate balance between outright leading the Iraqis and taking a "sink or swim" mentality. Sending more troops in would tilt the balance towards a continued occupation, and a complete withdraw will leave Iraq in complete shambles, which could result (very easily) in an Iran-backed Shi'ia dictatorship. The middle point in that spectrum is to guide the Iraqis along in finding their own destiny, much like the Marshall Plan did with European countries after WWII.
The Report is enumerated throughout with 79 Recommendations, many of which are obvious. The "plan" that the Report offers is basically to push Iraq toward complete self-governance, and to diplomatically engage allies and enemies to do so. I have no problem with this concept, and involving non-Coalition members in Iraq at this point seems like a very good idea.
However, here is where I think the Report runs astray. They strongly advocate engaging Iran and Syria, both neighbors to Iraq. The Group seems to assume that it is in Iran and Syira's best interests to see a stable, democratic Iraq. I find fault with this assumption that two of the most autocratic regimes (one a dictatorship, the other a theocracy) in the world would want a free, democratic, Muslim nation right in their own backyard. If this didn't seem to be such a crux of the Report, I think the entire thing would come across better.
One thing point that the Group makes that I find compelling is that there "is no military solution" in Iraq. They cite that US forces will go in, clear an area, and as soon as they leave, it will become "hot" again. You cannot fight a hydra like that. Cleaning up Iraq's ministries as well as reforming the US State department will go much further in understanding and eradicating the Sunni insurgency and the Shi'ia militias.
We need a complete overhaul on Iraq policy, and more importantly, attitude, and we need it soon.
You can read the Iraq Study Group Report free online here, or you can purchase a hard copy from the Amazon link above. I think it is worth serious consideration, but is not a full solution on its own.
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